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LESSONS AND LEGACIES XIII

New Approaches to an Integrated  
History of the Holocaust: Social History,  
Representation, Theory


*Edited and with an introduction  
by Alexandra Garbarini and Paul B. Jaskot*

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY PRESS EVANSTON, ILLINOIS

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Northwestern University Press  
www.nupress.northwestern.edu

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Printed in the United States of America

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

ISBN 978-0-8101-3767-7 (cloth)  
ISBN 978-0-8101-3766-0 (paper)  
ISBN 978-0-8101-3768-4 (ebook)

Cataloging-in-Publication data are available from the Library of Congress.

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“Franco, Savior of the Jews”? Tracing the  
Genealogy of the Myth and Assessing Its  
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THE LEGEND BY WHICH THE FRANCOIST GOVERNMENT CLAIMED TO have saved the lives of thousands of European Jews from the Holocaust constitutes one of the largest and most successful rescue myths in Holocaust historiography. The Spanish myth of the rescue is the result of a decadeslong propaganda campaign initiated by Franco's government toward the end of World War II and culminated with the public canonization of General Francisco Franco as rescuer and benefactor of Jews. The first time the regime utilized this propaganda was in the early postwar years, in the belief that presenting Franco's Spain as rescuer of Jews would help overcome the international isolation that the United Nations (UN) had imposed on the dictatorial regime for its fascist nature and unconcealed support of Nazi Germany during the war. Although Spain's reconciliation with the Western democracies was ultimately the consequence of the Cold War game of alliances, the propaganda concerning Franco's alleged mass rescue of Jews from the Holocaust certainly had a redemptive effect for the Spanish dictatorship. In fact, the myth of the rescue was not just spread by Franco's regime but also by foreign, mostly right-wing commentators in the West who saw in Franco's ultraconservative regime a useful ally in the global conflict with the Soviet Union. But far from extinguished, the whitewashing potential of this propaganda continued to be exploited by Franco Spain's Right until the death of the dictator in 1975. In fact, the myth of the rescue is still present today in Spain's official discourse in more concealed and sophisticated ways, evidencing the

myth's resilience and its capacity to adjust to the growing historiography on Spain and the Holocaust.

Unfortunately, most of the earliest historical accounts on Franco's Spain and the Holocaust were deeply influenced by the regime's propaganda. When Israeli historian Haim Avni published his pioneering monograph on *Spain, the Jews, and Franco* in 1974, he was quite right to say that "no study published so far has brought to light all the facts in their true perspective."<sup>1</sup> Avni's authoritative study was the first to approach the historical record without a political agenda, and it devoted a whole chapter to distinguishing "facts from fantasy" within the official mystified discourse. The fact that it was translated into English only in 1982, coupled with the slow opening of Spain's archives, was perhaps the reason why it took so long until the next scholarly study on the subject. Published in 1987, the book by Antonio Marquina Barrio and Gloria Inés Ospina, *España y los Judíos en el siglo XX (Spain and the Jews in the Twentieth Century)*, made an even harsher assessment of Francoist Spain's treatment of Jews during the war.<sup>2</sup> It was not until 2001, however, that the position of the Franco government toward the Spanish Jewish community living in countries under Nazi occupation was subject to thorough analysis. Grounding his research on German as well as Spanish diplomatic sources, Bernd Rother in his *Franco und der Holocaust (Franco and the Holocaust)* evidenced Spain's reluctance to repatriate its Jewish colony abroad in the context of the "repatriation campaign" (*Heimschaffungsaktion*) that Nazi Germany had offered to the neutral governments.<sup>3</sup> More recently, several other publications have added to our understanding of more specific research areas such as Spanish modern antisemitism and the transit of refugees through Spain.<sup>4</sup> Despite the consensus achieved by this historiography, there are still important gaps that merit further research. This is particularly the case for Franco's policies during the early years of World War II, when the Spanish dictatorship was still negotiating Spain's entry in the war alongside Nazi Germany, which it followed closely.

In April 1940, the chair of Lisbon's Comissão Portuguesa de Assistência aos Judeus Refugiados (COMASSIS), Augusto d'Esaguy, reported that "the situation of the Jews in Spain, as well as in Spanish Morocco, is getting worse every day"; and that the Spanish minister of interior—"an open advocate of racial and Nazi doctrine"—was preparing several police measures directed against Jews that would be "carried out secretly" in order not to "alarm public opinion."<sup>5</sup>

D’Esaguy’s predictions were confirmed in May 1941, when the minister of interior commanded the Spanish police to register all Jews in Spain in the so-called *Archivo Judaico* (Jewish Archive), a police file index created to that end.<sup>6</sup> In October 1941, and with the same secrecy, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry ordered Spanish shipping companies not to allow “the undesirable” Jews aboard Spanish vessels.<sup>7</sup> Other anti-Jewish policies included the government’s general mistreatment of Spanish Jews, whom it stripped of their Spanish nationality, as well as the irregular returning of refugees to the French border. When contextualized, the Spanish anti-Jewish stance of the early war years clearly calls into question the image of philosemitism and humanitarianism that the Franco regime started to profess even before the end of World War II.

#### THE WARTIME ORIGINS OF THE SPANISH RESCUE MYTH

The Francoist pro-Jewish propaganda had started already during 1943, when the downfall of Mussolini and the shifting balance of power in favor of the Allies obliged the Franco government to review its foreign policy approach. At that time, Madrid’s propaganda targeted mainly American diplomatic circles and aimed to contest the claims that Spain was ill-treating refugees and cooperating with Nazi Germany in the persecution of Jews. Interestingly, the stimulus to spread such propaganda did not come only from within the Franco regime. In March 1943, Rabbi Maurice Perlzweig, who headed the British wing of the World Jewish Congress (WJC), met with the Spanish ambassador in Washington, D.C., Juan Francisco de Cárdenas, to make two requests to the Spanish government: to authorize the Jewish communities of South America to send parcels to the European Jewish refugees stranded in Spain, and to negotiate with Germany the transit through Spain of Jewish children in Nazi-occupied Europe to avoid their deportation. Convinced that this was the perfect opportunity to alleviate the growing opposition to Franco’s regime in the United States, Ambassador Cárdenas tried to persuade his superiors that these initiatives would bring good publicity for the regime, and at virtually no cost.<sup>8</sup>

Madrid’s refusal to cooperate with the WJC did not stop Rabbi Perlzweig from mentioning in a May 1943 radio broadcast across the United States that “some twenty thousand refugees have found both

a temporary haven and security in Spain, and they have found these things in circumstances which would have denied them entrance into many other countries.”<sup>9</sup> This was also the case of the American Joint Distribution Committee (JDC), which on repeated occasions thanked Ambassador Cárdenas for the “sympathetic attitude of your government in Madrid in behalf of the refugees who have come to Spain.”<sup>10</sup> Given that the Franco government had the last word regarding Spain’s immigration and refugee policies, the powerless Jewish organizations had no alternative but to praise the government and hope for Spain’s cooperation in the refugee crisis. However, as the JDC representative in Barcelona, Samuel Sequerra, reported in October 1942, the reality of the refugee situation in Spain was far from ideal:

A large percentage of those trying to cross the border are being arrested by the Spanish authorities . . . the Spanish police demands of us that we give them the names of those who seek our help. If we so denounced them, they would be immediately arrested. . . . In spite of the fact that they know of the humanitarian work that we do, they do not stop torturing us. During the month of August they took away all our files and papers and returned them only after almost a month, and then only a part. . . . I should also mention the anti-Semitic campaign which the Spanish press is conducting. . . . The Jewish organizations in Portugal are simply admitted to function, and we are barely tolerated. . . . We must keep our problems of assistance very quiet in order to avoid difficulties with the authorities.<sup>11</sup>

The Spanish government’s first tangible propaganda efforts occurred in February 1944, when the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spread news throughout the Americas concerning the repatriation to Spain of 365 Sephardic Jews from Greece, “to counter the anti-Spanish campaign which insinuates that we follow a racist policy.”<sup>12</sup> What this propaganda did not mention was the fact that these Sephardim had Spanish citizenship and that the Spanish government had tried to avoid their repatriation for more than a year. Moreover, these Spanish Jews were only admitted into Spain on condition that American and Jewish relief groups would organize and cover the cost of this whole operation, which Madrid made conditional on the Sephardic refugees’ prompt evacuation from Spain.

Another important piece of propaganda was deployed during the WJC’s November 1944 annual convention in Atlantic City, New



Jersey. The WJC had invited the Jewish community of the Spanish Protectorate of Morocco to participate in the international meeting by sending a spokesperson. After some hesitation, the Spanish government understood that the conference was the perfect opportunity for “perplexing our enemies and earning many sympathies without compromising our position with anyone.”<sup>13</sup> In an attempt to disseminate the regime’s propaganda within the American Jewish community, Minister Jordana gave orders to find a spokesman—“as fond of the regime as possible”—and to give him “precise instructions” regarding what to say concerning Francoist Spain’s attitude towards Jews: “The Spanish legislation discriminates in no way whatsoever against them [Jews]. They receive absolutely the same treatment as the rest of the Spanish citizens in relation to their political and civil rights, without any limitation of access to public positions and official functions.”<sup>14</sup>

Meanwhile, in Washington, Rabbi Perlzweig continued to work toward ameliorating Francoist Spain’s image in the United States. This time, the rabbi requested from the Spanish government a list of all Spanish rescue efforts up to that date for publicity purposes. Three days later, the Spanish ambassador in Washington received a memorandum from Madrid in which the Spanish activities in favor of Jewish refugees had been multiplied and exaggerated to suggest a large rescue program orchestrated by the government.<sup>15</sup> The memorandum suggested, for instance, the alleged Spanish evacuation of Jewish children from Shanghai and Czechoslovakia, negotiations on behalf of Jews interned in Auschwitz-Birkenau, and the protection of Sephardic Jews held in concentration camps. Despite the fact that most of these claims were either unsubstantiated or misrepresented, the WJC issued a resolution thanking Spain for having protected many persecuted Jews.

In addition to the American Jewish organizations, the Franco regime’s propaganda also found its way into the U.S. printed media. In July 1944, for instance, the *New York Times* also praised Spain’s efficient role in “aiding European refugees from several nationalities, most of them Jews, proving wrong the defamation campaign of the left that assured that the Spanish government hindered these evacuations.”<sup>16</sup> Evidently, this idea was repeated to exhaustion in the Spanish media. In July 1945, the head of the Representation in Spain of American Relief Organizations (RSARO) sent the Lisbon JDC office “a sample of how screwy the [Spanish] press can make things”—namely, a Spanish

newspaper article claiming that Barcelona was to be “one of the chief transit centres for the repatriation of thousands of civilians liberated from German concentration camps.”<sup>17</sup>

Rather than questioning this propaganda, the U.S. State Department made at least two public declarations flattering Spain’s cooperation in the evacuation of Jewish refugees. On one occasion, for instance, Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long claimed that Spain had given shelter to no fewer than sixty thousand Jews: “[Spain was] one of the countries that contributed the most to alleviate the Jewish exodus during the war. Spain, despite not being a rich country, gave refuge to sixty thousand people who crossed the Pyrenees clandestinely, fleeing from German occupation. The Franco Government efficiently cooperated with the United States ambassador in Madrid and the Jewish Committee for Refugee Relief [*sic*], supplied them with food and money.”<sup>18</sup> As opposed to the Jewish relief organizations’ attempts to engage Spain’s support in the refugee crisis, the motivations behind the State Department’s declarations seem to be of a different kind. One possibility is that, by exaggerating the number of those allegedly rescued in cooperation with the Franco government, Breckinridge Long—who as head of the State Department’s Visa Division had been severely criticized for his obstructionist policies—was trying to exonerate its own controversial refugee and immigration policies.<sup>19</sup> It is also possible, however, that the U.S. State Department was simply paving the way for a future alliance with Franco’s government, the fervent anticommunism of which rendered it a most convenient ally in the ever-increasing competition against the Soviet Union.

#### THE POSTWAR PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN IN THE CONTEXT OF THE COLD WAR

As a consequence of the defeat of its former Italian and German homologues, Franco’s dictatorship entered a period of international isolation and economic autarky that severely threatened the stability and survival of the regime. On December 12, 1946, the UN General Assembly excluded Franco’s Spain from membership in any UN-related agency on the basis of its fascist “origin, nature, structure, and general conduct,” until a “new and acceptable government” was formed in Spain.<sup>20</sup> In an attempt to reverse the UN declaration, the

Franco regime implemented a series of reforms with the aim of improving the regime's image in the West.

The most urgent matter for the Spanish dictatorship was to free itself from the burden of the Axis stigma. Given that the persecution and extermination of Jews were among the defining characteristics of the vanquished Axis powers, the Franco government focused on further expanding its previous propaganda. Only a few days after the UN anti-Franco declaration, the Spanish MFA requested from all its legations in countries formerly occupied by Nazi Germany any information regarding aid given to Jews during the war. Despite the near lack of positive responses, the MFA prepared a report describing “the very ample protective efforts realized by Spain in favor of the Sephardi,” and forwarded it to Washington, D.C., and London.<sup>21</sup>

In the following months, this report grew into two propagandistic brochures. The fifty-page brochure *Spain and the Jews* (1949) was widely distributed by the MFA in Spanish, English, and French.<sup>22</sup> Simultaneously, the Spanish embassy in Washington published its own *Spain and the Sephardi Jews*, which synthesized the same theses in just five pages.<sup>23</sup> In addition to shamelessly misrepresenting Spain's humanitarianism and attitude toward the refugees more generally, this propaganda insisted on the regime's deeply Christian mores in an attempt to distance itself from “totalitarian materialism”—a term skillfully designed to conflate the Nazi regime with the Soviet Union: “Considered as a whole, the action taken by Spain to protect the Sephardi Jews during World War II is one of which Spain is justly proud. Such diplomatic protection of defenceless persons is not only one of the highest missions of the diplomatic purpose but also that of Christian charity to a neighbour who had been caught up in the ruthless wheels of totalitarian materialism.”<sup>24</sup> In addition to whitewashing the regime's past record, the Spanish government also enacted a decree that granted the vague status of “Spanish subjects abroad” (*súbditos españoles en el extranjero*) to a limited number of Sephardic Jews “whose love for Spain made them worthy of such honor.”<sup>25</sup> In practice, the regime was just playing to the gallery, for most potential “citizens abroad” had perished during the Holocaust and, in any case, this citizenship status was merely symbolic. Furthermore, this decree entered in clear contradiction with two circular orders issued secretly in the early postwar years “to avoid at all cost the entry and settlement in Spain of those Sephardic Jews who previously lived in a

foreign country.”<sup>26</sup> Despite the regime’s hypocrisy, Franco’s new decree proved quite successful in the Western media. The morning after the decree was officially enacted, the *Washington Post*’s front-page headline announced Franco’s determination to invite some one hundred thousand Sephardic Jews to return to Spain.<sup>27</sup> Jerusalem’s daily, the *Palestine Post*, followed soon after with the simple and yet powerful headline of “Franco Invites Jews to Return.”<sup>28</sup>

These initiatives signal the peak of the Spanish government’s propaganda efforts, and they paved the way for Spain’s reconciliation with the Western democracies, as tensions between the Western and Communist blocs escalated significantly. Following the Communist invasion of South Korea in June 1950, many anti-Franco commentators in the West started to see General Franco’s militant anti-Communism as a lesser evil than the feared spread of Communism. This was notably the opinion of former U.S. ambassador to Spain Alexander W. Weddell, who unapologetically defined Franco’s fascist regime as “bad, unqualifiedly bad, and one which I abhor” and yet was convinced that any attempt to overthrow the Franco government would result in another civil war that would open the gates of the Iberian Peninsula to the Soviet Union: “of the two evils, I prefer the former.”<sup>29</sup> This position was also shared by the State Department, whose first director of policy planning and Cold War policy, George Kennan, saw it as in the U.S. national interest to establish political and economic relations with Spain, “irrespective of wartime ideological considerations or the character of the regime in power.”<sup>30</sup>

The American pro-Franco shift ultimately led, in November 1950, to the abrogation of the UN’s 1946 anti-Franco declaration, which allowed for the progressive reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Spain and the West and put an end to the regime’s international isolation. This call to realpolitik, however, became particularly problematic for Israeli officials, who until then had been punitive of Franco’s fascist regime in international forums. In the midst of heated debates concerning Israel’s stance in the global conflict, an increasing number of right-wing Knesset members campaigned in favor of Spain’s joining the war against Communism. From early 1951 onward, the Israeli right-wing party Herut published a series of articles that capitalized on the Spanish myth of rescue to gain support for their cause. This was notably the case for Knesset member Benjamin Arditti, who in May 1951 published several articles claiming that Jews

were indebted to General Franco for his wartime rescuing of Jews of Spanish citizenship in Bulgaria. Later that year, Arditti represented the Bulgarian community of Israel at the World Congress of Sephardic Jews in Paris, during which he also publicly thanked Franco for the aid given to Jews during the war.<sup>31</sup>

But it was not just the Israeli right wing that propagated the myth of rescue as a means to enlist Franco in the war against Communism. Such was also the case with Richard Pattee, former assistant chief of the Division of Cultural Relations at the U.S. State Department, and director, since 1946, of the Latin American Bureau at the National Catholic Welfare Conference’s Social Action Department. As he stated in his visibly pro-Franco monograph, *This Is Spain* (1951):

Spain can indeed be proud of this page in her contemporary history, for the evidence reveals that the Madrid government utilized every avenue and took advantage of every channel to render aid to the Jews. . . . Within Spain, the religious, military, and civil authorities were generous to a fault in offering a sanctuary to those fleeing the concentration camps of Nazi Europe. . . . In the social field, the Spanish authorities have been spending upward of a million pesetas a year on behalf of the Jewish communities for such things as free school lunchrooms, clothing for those in distress, medical aid, and special donations for Jewish religious festivities.<sup>32</sup>

Despite the fantastic nature of these claims, Pattee’s book sold fifteen editions in just five years and was translated into three languages. The most hyperbolic representation of the Spanish propaganda, however, was printed in January 1953 by Norway’s right-wing and highest-circulated newspaper *Aftenposten*, which claimed that General Franco had saved the lives of more than three hundred thousand Jews from the gas chambers.<sup>33</sup>

#### FRANCOIST SPAIN’S PHILOSEMITISM: THE LEGITIMIZATION OF THE RESCUE MYTH

The relative success of the Spanish propaganda efforts was to a large extent dependent on the regime’s ability to adjust the Spanish dictatorship’s internal structure and political culture to Western democratic values. To this end, General Franco had appointed the monarchist and leader of the Spanish organization Acción Católica (Catholic

Action), Alberto Martín-Artajo, as minister of foreign affairs in 1945. The choice of a technocrat—rather than a high-ranking army official or a Falangist, a member of Spain's fascist political party—for such a crucial post was in tune with the regime's broader reform program, aimed at the defascistization of the Spanish dictatorship.<sup>34</sup> The single most essential piece of legislation from this period was the July 1945 Fuero de los Españoles (Spaniards' Charter of Rights), a pseudoconstitution that theoretically guaranteed the Spaniards' most basic civil liberties. In the words of British historian Paul Preston, the sole purpose of such "empty legislation" was "to give the impression that the Caudillo presided over a *sui generis* democracy and was not a dictator."<sup>35</sup> Nonetheless, the 1945 Fuero de los Españoles was instrumental to the support for Franco's pro-Jewish claims, insofar as it supposedly introduced religious freedom in Spain. Until then, National Catholic Spain had been rather hostile to the Spanish Jewish community, but this situation was no longer compatible with the regime's postwar propaganda. In this context, the Spanish government initiated a second line of propaganda aimed at presenting Franco's Spain as a tolerant and multicultural state with an interest in Sephardic culture. In addition to improving the regime's image in the West, this new philosemitic facade would give credibility to the regime's propaganda, retroactively legitimizing the government's allegations regarding the rescue of Jews during the Holocaust.

First and foremost, the regime needed to give some proof, even symbolic, of the implementation of religious freedom. As stipulated in the Fuero de los Españoles of 1945, religious practices other than the state-official Roman Catholic would be tolerated conditionally, as long as they did not threaten the "spiritual, national, and social integrity of Spain" (art. 33).<sup>36</sup> In January 1946, the Barcelona synagogue was authorized to hold Jewish prayers for the first time after being closed down by the rebel army back in 1939. This was accomplished thanks to the intercession of the WJC representative in Lisbon, Isaac Weissman, since the Franco government had initially opposed the petition of the Barcelona Jewish community.<sup>37</sup> The Jewish community of Madrid, however, had to wait until January 1949 for the government's sanction to establish a synagogue in the country's capital. Even then, the Barcelona and Madrid synagogues were in private houses and had no outward signs that defined them as places of worship, since only Catholics were allowed to make public exhibition of their faith.<sup>38</sup> After

a 1951 visit, Rabbi Ephraim F. Einhorn reported that Jews in Spain made “every effort to hide their identity” and that, realizing the fact that criticism was not a useful form of resistance against the Franco government, Spanish Jews had become accustomed to the regime’s “psychological and refined form of anti-Semitism, [which] finds its expression in an under-the-surface discrimination.”<sup>39</sup>

During the 1950s and 1960s, Francoist Spain’s rescue myth was put to the test when Spain was asked to assist the Jews of Egypt and Morocco, who were in distress due to the escalating Arab–Israeli conflict. Compelled by the regime’s own propaganda, Madrid authorized the issuing of documents and travel tickets to Jews wishing to leave these countries. As argued by Israeli historian Raanan Rein, there are many parallels between Spain’s reaction to the 1956 and 1967 wars in the Middle East and the World War II experience. As had happened during the Holocaust, humanitarian aid was in most cases restricted to Jews of Spanish citizenship, and the Spanish government was determined to avoid at any rate the resettlement of Jews in Spain. Additionally, this assistance owed once again to the initiative of Spanish diplomats abroad rather than to any consistent policy shaped by Madrid, which exaggerated these actions to further legitimize the rescue myth and improve its image in the West.<sup>40</sup>

As Danielle Rozenberg points out, this was a way to make symbolic gestures directed to the Jewish world without the need to establish formal diplomatic relationships with the state of Israel, which would have had a deleterious effect on Spain’s good diplomatic relationships with the Arab countries. In January 1960, for instance, the MFA met with diplomatic representatives of the Arab countries in Madrid to assure them that the Spanish government’s pro-Jewish initiatives were based on long-standing cultural bonds with the Sephardic community and had nothing to do with the conflict in the Middle East. The former head of Arab and Middle Eastern political affairs, who was at the time serving as Spanish Ambassador to Cairo, captured the government’s cautious and cynical treatment of the Jews when he said that “the Sephardic soul has always been a double-edged sword that should be used only when there is certainty that it will not fall into foreign hands.”<sup>41</sup>

One unintended consequence of the Spanish assistance to the exodus of Moroccan Jews to Israel during the 1956 Suez Crisis was the private audience that took place between General Franco and

Solomon Gaon, a prominent Sephardic rabbi and hakam of the Sephardic communities of the British Commonwealth. As future founder of the Sephardic Studies program at New York's Yeshiva University and promoter of the journal *The American Sephardi*, Rabbi Gaon soon became an essential link between the American Sephardic community and Spain.<sup>42</sup> Upon his request, the World Sephardi Federation (WSF) appointed Yair Behar as WSF representative to Spain in 1957. In the years following, Behar made an effort to increase the visibility of Sephardic Jewry, but aware of the delicate situation of the Jews in Spain, he opted for cultural and educational initiatives in cooperation with the Spanish Ministry of Education. The most important outcome of this collaboration was the World Sephardic Bibliographical Exhibition that took place at Madrid's National Library toward the end of 1959. The WSF had proposed that the Spanish government take this exhibition on a traveling tour to various European and American capitals, but the MFA rejected the plan, arguing that Jewish-Zionist propaganda would exploit this event to weaken Spain's position in the Arab world. After all, the Madrid exhibit had been authorized by the ministry on condition "that this exaltation of one facet of our own culture does not degenerate into a glorification of those aspects of Sephardic thought which are fundamentally antagonistic to the spiritual concept of the authentic Spain."<sup>43</sup>

Overall, the 1959 Sephardic exhibition in Madrid was a success that perfectly fit into the regime's propaganda efforts and political agenda. Among the attendees were the representatives of the World Jewish Congress, the World Zionist Organization, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and the Alliance Israélite Universelle, as well as president of the WSF, Denzil Sebag-Montefiore, and the hakam of the British Sephardim, Solomon Gaon, to whom General Franco then bestowed the order of Alfonso the Wise, one of Spain's highest honors. As reported by *The American Sephardi*, Rabbi Gaon gave a speech in the Sephardim's Judeo-Spanish language at the close of the exhibit that touched General Franco himself, who "wiping away his tears, declared: 'the Spanish Government is proud to have been able to save Jewish lives during the Second World War and wishes to do everything possible to develop cultural bonds between the Sephardim and Spain.'"<sup>44</sup>

From that moment forward, the Franco regime's gestures toward the Sephardim in particular, and the Jews more generally, became more



common and publicly visible. In 1961, the government established the Instituto de Estudios Sefardíes (Institute of Sephardic Studies), a joint initiative with the WSF to encourage research on the Judeo-Spanish language and the cultural heritage of the Spanish Jews. A direct consequence of this cooperation was the First Symposium of Sephardic Studies, which took place in Madrid in June 1964 and led to the publication of a 781-page volume at the Spanish Government's expense.<sup>45</sup> Also in 1964, the government unveiled a monument to Maimonides in the city of Córdoba, and the Caudillo authorized the establishment of a museum and a library devoted to Spanish-Jewish culture at Toledo's legendary El Tránsito synagogue.

It is no coincidence that the peak of Francoist Spain's pro-Jewish initiatives occurred in parallel with the reformist Second Vatican Council (1962–65). A self-defined loyal follower of the Roman Catholic Church, Franco's Spain could not ignore the church's formal acquittal of the Jews as murderers of Jesus Christ (*Nostra Aetate*, October 1965), nor its recognition of religious freedom as a fundamental right (*Dignitatis Humanae*, December 1965).<sup>46</sup> In 1965, General Franco had an audience with the heads of the Madrid and Barcelona Jewish communities, Alberto Levy and Max Mazin, respectively, which resulted in the formal recognition of Spain's four major Jewish communities of Madrid, Barcelona, Ceuta, and Melilla. Then came the Law of Religious Freedom of June 1967, by virtue of which the Spanish Jewish community was finally enabled to practice Judaism both in private and in public. This allowed, on December 16, 1968, for the inauguration of a synagogue in Madrid with the government's sanction. During the ceremony, the congregation also read a text prepared by the Spanish Ministry of Justice by which the 1492 Alhambra Decree was officially abrogated.<sup>47</sup>

The legal emancipation of the Jews of Spain toward the late 1960s constituted, in the eyes of many observers, the ultimate proof of the regime's sympathy toward Jews. Promoted by more than two decades of propaganda and unchallenged by the absence of a more nuanced analysis of the Spanish role in World War II, the government's claims of rescue and assistance to Jews during the war continued to be taken at face value. Upon General Francisco Franco's death in November 1975, the editors of *The American Sephardi* made an offering before the ark of New York's historic Sephardic synagogue in New York City “for the repose of the soul of Generalissimo Francisco Franco” and

thanked him for having helped the Jews during the war. The obituary concludes, “Putting to one side any other considerations, Jews should honour and bless the memory of this great benefactor of the Jewish people . . . who neither sought nor reaped any profit in what he did.”<sup>48</sup>

#### THE ROLE OF HISTORIANS: THE CONSOLIDATION OF FRANCO’S PROPAGANDA

Despite the gratitude shown by the American Sephardic community, Franco’s canonization as benefactor of Jews toward the end of his life would not have been possible without the endorsement of historical research. Unfortunately, the impossibility of accessing Spain’s archives, in contrast to the widespread availability of mystified publications, resulted in the consolidation and diffusion of Franco’s rescue narrative by a whole generation of historians. Moreover, there were at least three occasions in which the Spanish government, and even Franco himself were involved in the writing process.

This was the case, for instance, of one of Franco’s earliest and best-selling biographers. Quoting the government’s propaganda pamphlet *Spain and the Jews* (1949), Australian historian Brian Crozier stated that Franco “gave refuge to thousands of Hitler’s Jewish victims” and “made repeated efforts to get local Sephardic Jews to register as Spanish citizens” in France, Romania, Greece, and French Morocco. Crozier, who maintained correspondence with General Franco and was given advice by him during the writing process, also mentions that Franco “revived citizenship rights for the Sephardic Jewish community of Salonika to save it from Nazi persecution”<sup>49</sup>—a claim that is difficult to believe given the nearly complete annihilation of Salonika’s Jews during the Holocaust. Published in sixty-seven editions and translated into five different languages, Crozier’s biography of Franco became a powerful channel for the regime’s propaganda. British historian George Hills, who published his Franco biography the same year as Crozier, also accepted the regime’s propaganda at face value and noted that “Franco described with unusual sensitivity the plight of the Jews.”<sup>50</sup> This remark is illustrative of the near-legendary fascination that the regime’s propaganda created around the Caudillo, which produced all sorts of speculations regarding his personality and his reasons to aid the Jewish people. Harry S. May, for instance, hypothesized that it was due to the dictator’s concealed Jewish origins that he showed “humanism

and compassion” toward Jews and defended the Sephardim’s “inalienable right” to reclaim their Spanish citizenship.<sup>51</sup>

The second example of the Spanish government’s involvement in the writing process is Federico Ysart’s *España y los Judíos en la Segunda Guerra Mundial* (1973), the first monograph entirely devoted to the subject of Franco’s Spain and the Jews during the Second World War.<sup>52</sup> Commissioned by the Spanish MFA, this publication was clearly a premeditated attempt to legitimize the regime’s propaganda discourse. In addition to supplying its author with a selection of sources from its archives, the ministry also made several suggestions on Ysart’s initial draft to adjust it to the regime’s line of thought and insisted that it should be published by an independent press under the appearance of an independent academic publication.<sup>53</sup> Being one of the most widely cited publications on the subject, Ysart’s *España y los Judíos en la Segunda Guerra Mundial* has contributed greatly to the spread of the regime’s fabrications within the scholarly community.

A third publication that contributed to the propagation of the Spanish rescue myth is *Franco, Spain, the Jews and the Holocaust*, written by the American Rabbi Chaim U. Lipschitz during the 1970s but published only in 1984.<sup>54</sup> In January 1970, the MFA heard of Lipschitz’s research project and invited the rabbi to conduct research in Madrid and Barcelona, put an official car at the rabbi’s disposal, and paid all his accommodation expenses. More important, the ministry also supplied Rabbi Lipschitz with a selection of archival sources that were later translated and sent to Washington for the author’s convenience.<sup>55</sup> The resulting monograph, which was printed by one of the most influential publishers in the field of Judaica and Jewish studies, also includes the transcript of Rabbi Lipschitz’s interview with General Franco, in which the dictator commented on his rescue of Jews during the war and on the current situation of the Jewish community in Spain. The rabbi concluded that Franco “did, in fact, pull tens of thousands of Jews from the clutches of the Nazi juggernaut of genocide” and highlighted “the uniqueness of his humanitarian work as compared to the intransigence, deliberate stalling, and, in some cases, downright anti-Semitism” of the Allied democracies.<sup>56</sup>

The impact of these mystified publications on later historical research is difficult to measure. Shortly after General Franco’s death, Caesar C. Aronsfeld, Holocaust researcher and promoter of the Wiener Library in London, made one of the earliest attempts to write an

impartial narrative of the Spanish Jewish community's recent history. Unfortunately, Aronsfeld's *The Ghosts of 1492* (1979) was grounded on the limited and mystified available literature and was unable to discern between the actions of the individual Spanish diplomats who assisted Jews in countries under Nazi occupation and the policy of the government. As a result, Aronsfeld attributed the saving of thousands of Jews to Franco's personal initiative.<sup>57</sup> Similarly, Italian historian Enrico Deaglio also believed that the Spanish efforts to rescue European Jews from the Holocaust were driven by the "specific and energetic request of the *Generalísimo*" and that Spain's balance of rescue was "certainly superior to that of the anti-Nazi democracies."<sup>58</sup> A last example is that of Spanish historian Juan Antonio Cabezas, who, based on Lipschitz's theses, suggested a hypothetical "movement of redemption" carried out jointly by the Franco regime and the Vatican.<sup>59</sup>

In recent years, as a consequence of the growing scholarship on Francoist Spain, the quasi-legendary role of General Franco as savior of Jews has been slowly replaced by more articulated interpretations of the rescue myth. An illustrative example of this trend can be found in the work of American historian Willian D. Rubinstein, who considered Spain "a country whose policies were philosemitic, despite its fascist regime headed by Franco." Even though it represented the shift away from a Francocentric rescue narrative, however, Rubinstein still claimed that Spain willingly changed its immigration policies on two occasions, so that "*all refugees without exception [sic]* would be allowed to enter and remain."<sup>60</sup> In reality, Spain's refugee policy was significantly less welcoming, and not even the Sephardic Jewish refugees who had Spanish nationality were allowed to remain in the country. A second example of this phenomenon can be found in Wayne H. Bowen's recent work on Spanish collaborationism with Nazi Germany. According to Bowen, it was thanks to "the strong efforts of [wartime Foreign Affairs Ministers] Jordana and then Lequerica in Madrid" that the Spanish diplomats abroad "managed to save thousands of Jews by the end of the war."<sup>61</sup>

In terms of historiographical output, the subject of Franco's Spain and the Holocaust has been significantly more popular among non-Spanish than Spanish scholars. This situation has gradually shifted since the Spanish transition to democracy of the late 1970s, but especially during the widespread revisiting and reevaluation of the Spanish Civil War and the Francoist dictatorship during the early twenty-first cen-

ture in Spain.<sup>62</sup> Unfortunately, a significant amount of this historical production has been driven by right- and left-wing political affiliations rather than by a scholarly interest, resulting in simplistic readings of the subject with a clearly teleological intent.<sup>63</sup> On the Right side of the political spectrum, the politicization of the rescue myth has adopted the form of counterrevisionist publications that aim at reinvigorating the notion of a comprehensive rescue campaign “*In the name of Franco*”—such is the title of Arcadi Espada’s monograph.<sup>64</sup> On the Left, the hyperbolic distortion of historical evidence with political aims has gone in the opposite direction, as illustrated by Eduardo Martín de Pozuelo’s book *Francoism, Accomplice of the Holocaust* (2012).<sup>65</sup>

Finally, it is worth analyzing the shifting attitudes of the Spanish MFA in regard to the Francoist myth of rescue, as exemplified by the following four initiatives. The first of them is the ministry-sponsored academic monograph *Spain, the Sephardic Jews, and the Third Reich: The work of Spanish Diplomats against the Nazi genocide* (1997), which deliberately disregarded a portion of the available historiography as well as key archival documentation in a last attempt to prove the Francoist government’s supposed zeal in protecting the European Sephardic communities abroad.<sup>66</sup> Despite being severely criticized by the scholarly community, this publication marked the beginning of a new official discourse that focuses on highlighting and celebrating the “heroic” actions of Spanish diplomat-rescuers over the more controversial role of Madrid’s central government.<sup>67</sup>

The exhibition *Spanish Diplomats and the Holocaust: Visas for Freedom* (2000), which toured Spain and some of the Balkan countries where Sephardic communities had been located prior to the Holocaust, is illustrative of this shift in narrative.<sup>68</sup> Through this exhibition, the MFA acknowledged for the first time a more evidence-based interpretation of Francoist Spain’s treatment of Jews during World War II. Paradoxically, the exhibition’s greater emphasis on the actions of the few Spanish diplomats who intervened on behalf of Jews resulted—in spite of the apparent break from the former propaganda—in a self-congratulatory narrative that is, in essence, a modernized version of Franco’s long-standing myth.

Recently, this attempt to establish a “hall of fame” of national diplomat-rescuers crystallized in a second exhibition held on the very premises of the MFA in Madrid under the revealing title of *Beyond Duty: The Foreign Service’s Humanitarian Response to the Holocaust*

(2014).<sup>69</sup> This exhibition evidenced the ministry's determination to reduce a complex and unpleasant national reality of Spain's recent history into a self-congratulatory narrative gravitating around "those members of the Foreign Service who, from their European destinations, and with exemplary courage, saved thousands of Jews from a certain death under the sole protection of the Spanish flag."<sup>70</sup> This new official narrative was consolidated in a book published by the ministry itself shortly after the exhibition, which highlights the "outright, decisive, and proactive" attitude of the vaguely termed "Spanish Foreign Service," in an attempt to revive for the Spanish democracy the myth once propagated by Franco, now without the dictator.<sup>71</sup>

### CONCLUSION

As recalled by *Jewish Digest* founder Bernard Postal following Francisco Franco's death in November 1975, the fact that the last-standing fascist dictator in Europe had rescued thousands of Jews during the war remained "one of the great ironies of 20<sup>th</sup> century history."<sup>72</sup> But far from merely anecdotal, the myth of the rescue's redemptive potential constituted a crucial asset for General Franco's fascist dictatorship, which carefully cultivated and disseminated it for decades. This redemptive quality was first put into practice toward the second half of World War II as a means to readjust the regime's image to the shifting balance of power. After the war ended, Franco's former sympathies toward the defeated Axis powers drove the regime into a period of international isolation and economic autarky that severely threatened the survival of the regime. It was then that the propaganda regarding Franco's alleged mass rescue of European Jews was presented to the West as a token of the regime's charitable nature, and, more important, as a vital point of divergence with Nazi Germany's antisemitic policies. With the escalating Cold War, the fear of Communism led many in the Western hemisphere to echo the regime's propaganda in their public appeals, calling to recruit Franco's fervent Catholicism and anti-Communism in the conflict against the Soviet Union. Despite attaining its desired reconciliation with the Western democracies in the early 1950s, Franco's government continued to nurture the myth of the rescue through cultural initiatives, as a means to authenticate its professed religious tolerance and interest in Sephardic Jewish culture. Pleased with the dictator's increasing concessions toward Jews, both

the Spanish Jewish community and certain sectors of the American Jewish community became increasingly supportive of the regime, thus contributing to the further legitimization of the Spanish rescue myth. The galvanizing factor of the legend, however, was the perpetuation of then myth in publications by a number of independent scholars, who, due to both the Spanish government’s interfering and the unavailability of archival material, validated Franco’s propaganda as historically factual.

#### NOTES

I wish to thank the editors of this volume, Alexandra Garbarini and Paul Jaskot, for sharing their very useful comments and ideas with me during the writing of this chapter.

1. Haim Avni, *Spain, the Jews, and Franco*, trans. Emanuel Shimoni (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1982), 3. First published in Hebrew in 1974.

2. Antonio Marquina Barrio and Gloria Inés Ospina, *España y los Judíos en el siglo XX: La Acción Exterior* (Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1987).

3. Bernd Rother, *Franco und der Holocaust* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2001). I will be citing the Spanish translation, *Franco y el Holocausto* (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2005); English translations from this edition are mine. On this topic, see also Bernd Rother, “Spain and the German Repatriation Ultimatum 1943/44,” in *Bystanders, Rescuers or Perpetrators? The Neutral Countries and the Shoah*, ed. Corry Guttsstadt et al. (Berlin: Metropol, 2016), 169–79.

4. On Spanish antisemitism, see Isabelle Rohr, *The Spanish Right and the Jews, 1898–1945: Antisemitism and Opportunism* (Brighton, U.K.: Sussex Academy Press, 2007). On the matter of refugees, see Rosa Sala Rose, *La penúltima frontera: Fugitivos del nazismo en España* (Barcelona: Papel de Liar, 2011); Josep Calvet, *Huyendo del Holocausto: Judíos evadidos del nazismo a través del Pirineo de Lleida* (Barcelona: Milenio, 2015).

5. Augusto D’Esaguy, COMASSIS Lisbon, to HICEM Paris, April 5, 1940, YIVO Archives, RG 245.4, Series I, File XII, MKM-13.36#3. The minister of interior to whom D’Esaguy refers in this letter is José Finat, Count of Mayalde.

6. Jacobo Israel Garzón, “El Archivo Judaico del Franquismo,” *Raíces: Revista judía de cultura* 84 (2010): 51–55.

7. Jesus María de Rotaecche, Ministry of Commerce’s Director General, to MFA, October 23, 1941, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM), RG-36.001M, R-1190-83-6.

8. See Bernd Rother, "Myth and Fact—Spain and the Holocaust," in *The Holocaust in Spanish Memory: Historical Perceptions and Cultural Discourse*, ed. Antonio Gómez-Quíñones and Susana Zepp (Leipzig: Leipzig Universitätsverlag, 2010), 53.
9. Rother, *Franco y el Holocausto*, 384–85.
10. JDC secretary Moses A. Leavitt to Ambassador Cárdenas, December 30, 1943, JDC Archives, AR193344, Reel 69, Folder 916.
11. Sequerra to JDC Lisbon, October 2, 1942, JDC Archives, AR193344, Reel 69, Folder 914.
12. MFA memo to all Spanish Embassies in the Americas except Washington, La Habana, and San Salvador, February 19, 1944; cited in Rother, "Myth and Fact," 55.
13. Javier Martínez de Bedoya, press attaché of the Spanish Embassy in Lisbon, to Minister Jordana, April 11, 1944, Archivo del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores (hereafter cited as AMAE), R-1716, Folder 4. My translation.
14. Cited in José Antonio Lisbona: *Retorno a Sefarad: la Política de España hacia sus Judíos en el Siglo XX* (Barcelona: Riopiedras ediciones, 1993), 123–24. My translations.
15. See letter exchange between Ambassador Cárdenas and the MFA, November 14 and 21, 1944; cited in Rother, "Myth and Fact," 56.
16. As reproduced by the Spanish media: EFE, "España ha ayudado a la Evacuación de Refugiados Europeos," *ABC Andalucía*, July 23, 1944, 9. My translation.
17. Robert L. Briggs, RSARO Madrid, to JDC Lisbon, July 22, 1945, YIVO Archives, RG-335.5, Reel 68, Folder 727. Briggs's own translation.
18. Breckinridge Long's declaration first appeared in New York's *Daily News* on June 14, 1946, and was reproduced in the Spanish press the following day. The two articles referred to are EFE, "España ha ayudado a la evacuación de refugiados europeos," *ABC Andalucía*, July 23, 1944, 9; EFE, "España Protegió a Sesenta Mil Judíos," *ABC Madrid*, June 15, 1946, 7–8. My translations.
19. For greater insight into Breckinridge Long's personality and the debate around his controversial refugee policies at the U.S. State Department, see Rebecca Erbelding, "About Time: The History of the War Refugee Board" (Ph.D. thesis, George Mason University, 2015), 40–42.
20. UN General Assembly, Resolution 39/1. Relations of Members of the United Nations with Spain (December 12, 1946), *Fifty-ninth Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations*. <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/032/83/IMG/NR003283.pdf?OpenElement>.
21. MFA to Spanish Legation in London, July 24, 1948, and MFA to



the Spanish Legation in Washington, D.C., July 26, 1948; cited in Rother, “Myth and Fact,” 59.

22. MFA, *Datos sobre la protección a los judíos sefarditas* (Madrid, 1948), AMAE, 2996/1; MFA, *Spain and the Jews* (Madrid, 1949), in Leo Baeck Institute, DS-135.S7.S72. The brochure’s French translation is cited in Avni, *Spain, the Jews and Franco*, 179.

23. MFA, *Spain and the Sephardic Jews* (Washington, D.C.: Spanish Embassy, 1949), in American Jewish Historical Society Archive, DS-135.S7.S7.

24. *Ibid.*, 5.

25. Francisco Franco, “Decreto-ley de 29 de Diciembre de 1948 por el que se reconoce la condición de súbditos españoles en el extranjero a determinados sefardíes, antiguos protegidos de España,” *Boletín Oficial del Estado* 9 (January 9, 1949). My translation.

26. Circular Orders number 2083 and 2088 “Sobre Nacionalidad de Sefarditas y su Entrada en España,” July 24 and October 10, 1945, respectively, AMAE, R-1672, Folder 1; Cited in Lisbona, *Retorno a Sefarad*, 123–24. My translation.

27. Associated Press, “Sephardic Jews Invited Back by Spain: Franco Decree Involves Descendants of About 100,000 Ousted in 1492,” *Washington Post*, January 10, 1949, 1.

28. Associated Press, “Franco Invites Jews to Return,” *Palestine Post*, January 12, 1949, 2.

29. Editor, “Sound Advice on Franco from Mr Weddell,” *Richmond News Leader*, June 11, 1946.

30. Keenan to State Department, October 24, 1947; cited in Raanan Rein, *Shadow of the Holocaust and the Inquisition: Israel’s Relations with Francoist Spain* (London: Routledge, 1997), 83.

31. *Herut*, May 11, 1951; cited in Rein, *Shadow of the Holocaust*, 120.

32. Richard Pattee, *This Is Spain* (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1951), 396–404.

33. Previously, on May 7, 1945, *Aftenposten* had published the Nobel laureate Knut Hamsun’s infamous obituary of Adolf Hitler, causing great controversy. Synnøve Stray Fischer, “Los ‘judíos españoles’ han escapado de las cámaras de gas de Hitler” (Spanish translation), *Aftenposten*, January 15, 1953; cited in Orti, *Spanish Perception*, 82–84.

34. In the aftermath of World War II, the Francoist regime got rid of some Falangist symbols such as the fascist salute, which had been the compulsory national salute since April 1937. Enrique Moradiellos, *La España de Franco (1939–1975): Política y sociedad* (Madrid: Síntesis, 2000), 106.

35. Paul Preston, *Franco* (London: Basic Books, 1994), 537–39.

36. Cited in Danielle Rozenberg, *La España Contemporánea y la*

*Cuestión Judía: Retejiendo los hilos de la memoria y de la historia* (Madrid: Casa Sefarad-Israel/Marcial Pons, 2010), 45.

37. Isaac Weissman to Maurice L. Perlzweig, "Our work for free exercise of religion in Spain," December 31, 1945, USHMM, RG-67.014M, Reel 314, 10.027-8.

38. Rein, *Shadow of the Holocaust*, 16.

39. AJP, "Spain's Jews Try to Hide Identity as Anti-Semitic Tension Flourishes," [Barcelona] *Sentinel*, September 20, 1951, 3.

40. Raanan Rein, "Diplomacy, Propaganda, and Humanitarian Gestures: Francoist Spain and Egyptian Jews, 1956-1968," *Iberoamericana* 6, no. 23 (2006): 21-33.

41. José Felipe de Alcover to Fernando María Castiella, Minister of Foreign Affairs, January 26, 1960, AMAE, R-5965, Folder 40; cited in Rozenberg, *La España Contemporánea*, 198-99.

42. Although politically independent from the Franco regime, the *American Sephardi* (published by the Sephardic Studies Program of Yeshiva University between 1966 and 1978) celebrated each of its pro-Jewish initiatives with reverence and dedicated an extensive and laudatory obituary to General Franco in its last issue of 1978. See, for instance, Maír José Benardete, "Spain Grants Freedom of Religion to the Jews: An Excursion into the Realms of the Imagination and Vision," *American Sephardi* 1, no. 2 (June 1967): 26-30; Richard D. Barnett, "Sephardi Museum Inaugurated in Toledo, Spain," *American Sephardi* 5, nos. 1-2 (1971): 143-45.

43. Rein, *Shadow of the Holocaust*, 184-85.

44. Herman P. Salomon and Tomás L. Ryan de Heredia, "In Memoriam: Francisco Franco (1892-1975), Benefactor of the Jews," *American Sephardi* 9 (1978): 216.

45. Iacob M. Hassán et al., eds., *Actas del Primer Simposio de Estudios Sefardíes* (Madrid: Instituto Arias Montano, 1970).

46. The *Ley de Principios del Movimiento Nacional* (May 17, 1958) declared the Spanish nation as subordinate to the "Law of God," meaning that Spanish legislation should be inspired by the doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church.

47. "Spanish Government Formally Rescinds 1492 Decree Ordering Expulsion of Jews," *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, December 17, 1968.

48. Salomon and Ryan de Heredia, "In Memoriam," 215-18.

49. Brian Crozier, *Franco* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), 7, 388. First published in 1949.

50. George Hills, *Franco: The Man and his Nation* (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 408. First published in 1949.

51. Harry S. May, *Francisco Franco: The Jewish Connection* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1977), 13-28.

52. Federico Ysart, *España y los Judíos en la Segunda Guerra Mundial* (Barcelona: Dopesa, 1973).

53. The assessment of Ysart’s and Lipschitz’s monographs is consensual among scholars of Francoist Spain and the Holocaust. See, for instance, Marquina and Ospina, *España y los Judíos en el siglo XX*, 222–24; Lisbona, *Retorno a Sefarad*, 120–21; Rother, “Myth and Fact,” 51–63.

54. Chaim U. Lipschitz, *Franco, Spain, the Jews, and the Holocaust* (New York: Ktav Publishing House, 1984).

55. See Marquina and Ospina, Lisbona, and Rother, as cited in note 53 above.

56. Lipschitz, *Franco, Spain, the Jews, and the Holocaust*, 168.

57. Caesar C. Aronsfeld, *The Ghosts of 1492: Jewish Aspects of the Struggle for Religious Freedom in Spain, 1848–1976* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 47–55.

58. Enrico Deaglio, *La Banalità del Bene: Storia di Giorgio Perlasca* (Milan: Feltrinelli Editore, 1991), 125.

59. Juan Antonio Cabezas, *Madrid y sus Judíos* (Madrid: Avapiés, 1987), 175. My translation.

60. William D. Rubinstein, *The Myth of Rescue: Why Democracies Could Not Have Saved More Jews from the Nazis* (London: Routledge, 1997), 146.

61. Wayne H. Bowen, *Spaniards and Nazi Germany: Collaboration in the New Order* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2000), 164–65, 205.

62. See chapter 7 in Helen Graham, *The War and Its Shadow: Spain’s Civil War in Europe’s Long Twentieth Century* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2012).

63. For an analysis of the politicization of the rescue myth in Spain, see Alejandro Baer and Pedro Correa, “The Politics of Holocaust Rescue Myths in Spain: From Francoist Humanitarianism to the Righteous Diplomats,” in *Bystanders, Rescuers or Perpetrators? The Neutral Countries and the Shoah*, ed. Corry Guttsstadt et al. (Berlin: Metropol Verlag, 2016), 205–16.

64. Arcadi Espada, *En Nombre de Franco: Los Héroes de la Embajada de España en el Budapest Nazi* (Barcelona: Espasa, 2013).

65. Eduardo Martín de Pozuelo, *El Franquismo, Cómplice del Holocausto: Y otros Episodios Desconocidos de la Dictadura* (Barcelona: La Vanguardia, 2012).

66. David Salinas, *España, los Sefarditas y el Tercer Reich (1939–1945): La Labor de Diplomáticos Españoles contra el Genocidio Nazi* (Valladolid: MFA and Universidad de Valladolid, 1997).

67. Baer and Correa, “Politics of Holocaust Rescue Myths,” 210.

68. Alejandro Baer et al., *Diplomáticos Españoles ante el Holocausto: Visados para la Libertad* (MFA and Casa Sefarad-Israel, 2000). Exhibition catalog.

69. *Más Allá del Deber: La respuesta humanitaria del Servicio Exterior*

*frente al Holocausto* (Madrid, November–December 2014). Exhibition catalog.

70. Excerpt from the commemorative plaque unveiled during the exhibition's inauguration at the MFA's premises in Madrid. Cited in Baer and Correa, "Politics of Holocaust Rescue Myths," 214.

71. José Antonio Lisbona, *Más Allá del Deber: La respuesta humanitaria del Servicio Exterior frente al Holocausto* (Madrid: MFA, 2015), 41. My translation.

72. Bernard Postal, "How Spain's Franco Saved 12,000 Jews," *Sentinel*, March 25, 1976, 27.